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MICHAEL MOORE**
The topic of this symposium is "theories and the law." Since this is
such an enormously broad topic, the first thing to do is to narrow it a bit.
As I shall discuss it, the topic is not on the central topic of jurisprudence,
which is the theory of law. My topic is theories within our law, rather
than theories about the nature of law in general. Often we call such
theorizing internal to the law we have, "internal jurisprudence," to be
contrasted with an "external jurisprudence" that is about law as such.
Within internal jurisprudence, there is still considerable variation in the
generality of the object of one's theorizing. One can theorize about
areas of law, as I intend to do, or one can theorize about discrete causes
of action within areas of law, developing "theories of negligence," and
the like. One can also theorize about items as discrete as a "theory of a
case," as lawyers use the phrase to refer to a basis for recovery in a
particular case. Such internal theories can, on the other hand, be as
broad as Ronald Dworkin's kind of internal jurisprudence, which is
about law (as we practice it in the Anglo-American legal culture) itself.
Irrespective of their level of generality, I call all of these theorizings
internal jurisprudence.' Such jurisprudence is "internal" in the sense that
* Speech at the Section on Jurisprudence, American Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting (Jan. 8, 2000). This speech was drawn from Michael S. Moore, A
Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 115 (1990), reprinted in
MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 1, at
3 (1997).
** Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. S.J.D.
1978, J.D. 1976, Harvard University; A.B. 1964, University of Oregon.
1. On the difference between internal and external jurisprudence, see Michael
Moore, Hart's Concluding Scientific Postscript, 4 LEGAL THEORY 301 (1998), reprinted
in MICHAEL MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE ch. 3 (forthcoming 2000).
the theories that I shall discuss are theories within the law, theories that
aim to be a part of the law of which they are a theory.
In setting out our topic, we next need to be clear about what we mean
by a "theory" of something. A theory is a set of general statements that
aim at justifying, explaining, or describing some more discrete legal
phenomena, be it a doctrine, an area of law, or a particular case decision.
Generically, we should think of a theory simply as a set of general
statements doing one of these three tasks. More specifically, the kind of
theory that interests me here is what I call a descriptive theory. It is not
an explanatory theory. Such a descriptive theory does not aim to give an
explanation of why we have particular doctrines or why particular cases
were decided as they were. Consider by way of example Richard
Posner's early foray into theory-building, his "theory of negligence" in
terms of efficiency. I took Posner, in that early article, not to be giving
a historical account explaining why we had the common law of
negligence that we did at the turn of the century. Such a descriptive
theorizing was not an attempt to show that the judges who decided 1528
turn-of-the-century negligence cases were motivated in their decisions
by efficiency considerations, nor was it an attempt to show that
somehow (by the invisible hand) the goodness of efficiency caused the
cases to be decided as they were. Posner's theory was not causally
explanatory in that way at all. But neither was such theorizing overtly
evaluative. Efficiency was not put forward in an attempt to evaluate the
tort law that we have by some external normative standard. It was not
that kind of a reform-oriented theory, or what I call a purely evaluative
theory. Rather, Posner, like Langdell before him,3 aimed to describe (at
a very general level) the doctrines he found to exist in American tort law
at the turn of the century4 His was a descriptive theory in the sense that
it, like the law of which it was a theory, was a description of what had
been decided in particular cases. The theory differed from the doctrines
only in that the theory was at a more general level than most of the
doctrines.
If we distinguish such descriptive theorizing from both explanatory
and evaluative theorizing, it is natural to wonder why anyone would
engage in this task of descriptive theory building. The answers are
various. What apparently motivates some theorists is their architectonic
2. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
3. See generally C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed.
Boston, Little Brown (1880); C.C. LANODELL, A SELETION OF CAsEs ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACrs (Boston, Little Brown 1871). Morris Cohen sympathetically portrays
Langdell's vision of theory-building in law in Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29
HARv. L. REv. 622-39 (1915).
4. See Posner, supra note 2.
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ambitions-a desire to display the law as having a pleasing logical
architecture. While such a motive may well explain some theorists'
activities, such aesthetic motivation is no justification for the activity. It
is kind of "arts-for-arts-sake" justification that can "move" (that is,
motivate) certain theorists, but it does not justify anybody else in paying
much attention to their theories. Theories of law, in truth, are pretty
poor art. So we need something else to justify descriptive theorizing
about law.
It is morality, not aesthetics, which justifies construction of descriptive
theories in law. Let me separate several strands to this moral
justification for theorizing. To begin with, morality enjoins us to
generalize more particular doctrines into more general ones in order to
treat alike litigants who are in fact alike in relevant ways. The goal, in
other words, is one of equality, treating alike people who differ from one
another only by the fact that they happen to be captured by isolated
pockets of doctrines of different sorts. Suppose, for example, that
landlords are liable in torts to those with whom they are not in privity of
contract (such as guests of tenants), but that manufacturers are not liable
in torts to those with whom they are not in privity of contract (such as
remote purchasers in a chain of distribution). Although compartmentalized
in different areas of doctrine, one might well think, as did Cardozo,5 that
there is no relevant difference between such classes of litigants. If either
a remote purchaser or a guest of a tenant is within the class of persons
foreseeably hurt by negligent activity (be it manufacturing or residential
leasing), such persons are owed a duty of care in torts. It is a more
general, descriptive theory that allows one to see such similarities (and
also any relevant differences). One reason to construct such theories is
thus to enhance equality before the law with which litigants are treated.
The second moral goal justifying descriptive theorizing is to enhance
the completeness of the law. More general descriptive theories have the
capacity to extend doctrine to hitherto unknown areas. When a fellow
named John Moore came before the California Supreme Court in the
early 1990s, there was no obvious law in California on whether he had a
property right in what came to be known as his "three billion dollar
spleen."' (The spleen was valued, at least in his complaint, at three
5. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916).
6. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990). Then-Chief
Justice Malcolm Lucas told me that he and other members of the court dubbed Moore
the "man with the golden spleen."
billion dollars because of the capacity to do recombinant DNA research
with it.) There was no obvious California property law on spleens or
other severed body parts; however, there was a set of more general
principles of property law, as Stanley Mosk pointed out in his dissenting
opinion.7 Such principles defined what property is and normatively
justified the allocation of those distinctive legal rights we think of as
property entitlements. Such principles constitute part of a theory of
property. Such a theory allowed a principled extension to the novel case
in a way that the doctrine did not.
There were no spleen cases, nor were there any body part cases, in
California. At the level of doctrine, the Moore case was thus a "case of
first impression." Yet such cases of supposed "first impression" are not
that unusual if one ignores more general theories of law. You may
remember Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous joke about the Vermont
justice of the peace who was assigned a case in which a farmer
complained that another farmer came on his land and broke his butter
chum. The justice remarked that he had looked up butter churns in the
Vermont Code and in the cases, and, having found no butter chum
statutes or cases, gave judgment for the defendant. Holmes regarded
that as a joke, which lawyers in common law countries well understand.
Common law lawyers regard that as a joke because the justice was guilty
of an obvious failure of generalization. It was a failure to see that there
is no relevant difference between butter chums and other objects broken
maliciously by somebody else. If the malicious plow-destroyer ought to
pay for the plow, the malicious butter chum-destroyer ought to pay for
the butter chum. There is no morally relevant difference. It is a
descriptive theory that allows the kind of generalization that extends
doctrine to new areas.
Third, there is a moral justification for theorizing an area of law even
if one is neither changing isolated pockets of legal doctrine to conform
to the mass of settled law nor creating new legal doctrine in cases of first
impression. We legal professionals would like to think that we owe
allegiance to the law, that it obligates us in our role as legal
professionals. Seemingly, to have such obligations is at a minimum for
there to be some good served by some particular legal institution, be it a
case decision, a more general cause of action, an area of law, or Anglo-
American law itself. And to show that such goods are served by things
legal is to have some kind of a general theory. Such a theory shows us
why settled doctrines are good doctrines to have in our legal system,
good in the sense that such doctrines serve some end that is sufficiently
worthy as to obligate us to them.
7. Id. at 506.
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Fourth and lastly, more general theories can serve a valuable heuristic
function. As Langdell pointed out long ago with reference to the
doctrines of contract law, it is easier to know a few general principles
than it is to know a multitude of more finely grained doctrines. It is
good that law be knowable to those to whom it is applied-good
because it enhances their liberty, lessens unfair surprise, and heightens
the efficiency of self-executing laws. By serving a heuristic function,
descriptive theories serve these goods of liberty, fairness, and efficiency.
Now let me turn to some criticisms of descriptive theories in law. I
shall consider four such criticisms. The first is that descriptive theories
pretend to be value-free when they are not, should not, and cannot be
value-free. In the history of jurisprudence, this criticism does not lack
targets. Langdell's theory of contracts in terms of his meeting of the
minds principle,9 Posner's theory of efficiency for torts, 0 Rolf Sartorius"
and Herbert Wechsler,1 2 all thought that they had neutral, value-free
theories of law. I am not one of those folks. Descriptive theories must
contain some evaluations in order to have an acceptable theory of an
area of law. Mostly, this is because of the reasons given above
justifying the doing of the theorizing. If you are trying to justify settled
doctrine, to extend it to new areas, or to synthesize it into larger and
larger wholes, that can only be done in light of some moral vision about
what the end or function of that area of law or legal institution is. One
cannot, for example, decide when one case is deserving of like treatment
with another case except by some theory as to what are relevant
similarities and differences; such relevance can only be a matter of
substantive moral judgment because equality is not served by treating
cases alike that are alike only in morally irrelevant ways." So I am not
one of those claiming that descriptive theories are, can be, or should be
value-free.
Another criticism is that theories of law are necessarily metaphysical,
and that is bad. While heavy-duty metaphysics may well characterize
8. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 3. See also Cohen, supra note 3.
9. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 3.
10. See Posner, supra note 2, at 37.
11. See generally ROLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDuCT AND SOCIAL NORMS
(1975).
12. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
13. For my rejection of purely formal equality (i.e., like treatment of cases that are
alike only in formally categorized ways) see Michael S. Moore, Legal Principles
Revisited, 82 IOWA L. REv. 867 (1997), reprinted in MOORE, supra note 1.
the theories I happen to favor, it is not necessarily true of theories of
areas of law as such. Theories about areas of law can have metaphysics
within them, such as a corrective justice theory of tort liability heavily
relying on some metaphysics of causation. 4 Or, theories can have a
metaphysical justification for theorizing, as when you are theorizing
about a kind and its nature is such that it invites theoretical depth. This
is most plausibly the case about natural kinds like water, but also
perhaps about moral or functional kinds, too.15 Yet there is nothing
necessarily connecting theories to metaphysics. I think everyone, save
Stanley Fish, can have theories in my sense, whatever their taste for
metaphysics.
Coming then, to the third criticism, it goes something like this.
Stanley Fish vis-4-vis my theories is like Edmond Burke vis-4-vis
Locke's theories. For Fish shares with Burke a distrust of any kind of
abstract generalization and thus a distrust of theory in my sense.'6 Fish
(and Burke) have a metaphysical distrust, too, but that is separate. The
distinct distrust here considered is the distrust of abstractions, including
abstractions of the sort I call a theory. They doubt the existence or the
usefulness of any generalizing set of statements that deductively justifies
(with suitable connecting promises) more particular legal institutions-
that is, they doubt the existence or the usefulness of theory. Consider as
our example a theory of criminal law. Such a theory starts with
something very abstract and very general, namely, what is the value
served by that area of law? I defend retributive theory, one that says that
the point of criminal law is to achieve retributive justice,'7 but there is
nothing here that turns on adopting my particular theory. However, for
illustration, suppose that criminal law serves retributive justice; then
punishment is proper when, but only when, offenders are morally
blameworthy. So now we need a theory of moral blameworthiness or
responsibility. I divide blameworthiness into two parts, moral
wrongdoing and moral culpability. 8 We now need a theory of the nature
of these two items. For wrongdoing, I have a theory that goes like this.
14. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility, 16 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
1, 4(1999).
15. On the justification for theorizing given by a metaphysics of kinds, see, for
example, Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 107 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
1773, 1781 (1987). For a summary of Burke's basis for distrusting theory, see Michael
S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263,
266-71 (1996).
17. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW chs. 2-4 (1997).
18. See id. at ch. 9.
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Sometimes wrongdoing is a voluntary act that without justification
causes a harmful state of affairs. This is what I call the consequentualist
kind of moral wrongdoing. Alternatively, sometimes wrongdoing
consists in the unjustified doing of any action that violates an "agent-
relative" prohibition of morality; this is the deontological view of moral
wrongdoing. I think both kinds of wrongdoing are prohibited by our
criminal law." Culpability is the intent to do a wrongful act or foresight
that you are doing a wrongful act or unreasonably risking that you are
doing a wrongful act, in situations where the actor is without excuse.
Each of these elements of wrongdoing and culpability in their turn invite
their own subtheories. For wrongdoing, we need a theory of voluntary
action,2' a theory of causation,2 a theory of what makes some states of
affairs harmful.' We also need a theory of justification, that is, a theory
that can tell us when a prima facie wrongful action is not actually
wrongful because it is justified.24 Turning to culpability, we need a
theory about intentions, beliefs, and their objects. 2 We need a theory of
negligence, and we need a theory of excuse.'
Each of these items, in turn, will invite yet more particular theories.
For example, if part of our theory of voluntary action includes some
state of willing or volition, we will need a theory about the nature of that
mental state;27 if part of our theory of causation involves "intervening
causes," we will need a theory of intervening causes;28 if part of our
theory of excuse is in terms of character, we will need a theory of
character;2 1 and so on. Moreover, we will also then need to theorize each
of the subcategories of justification and excuse. We will need theories
of self-defense, defense of others, insanity, duress, and the like. And, of
course, a theory of each of these will need some theory making sense of
the various elements of these discrete defenses, such as the retreat
19. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, AcT AND CRimE: THE PHiLOSOPHY OF AcTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993).
20. See MOORE, supra note 17, at chs. 9-10.
21. See MOORE, supra note 19, at chs. 2-6.
22. See Moore, supra note 14.
23. See J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
24. See MOORE, supra note 17, at ch. 17.
25. See id. at ch. 11.
26. See id. at chs. 12-13.
27. See MOORE, supra note 19, at ch. 6.
28. See Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 827 (2000).
29. See MOORE, supra note 17, at 548, 562-92.
obligation in self-defense. And away we go, to theorize about the
"castle exception" to the retreat exception to the self-defense
justification. Eventually, we will be theorizing about the best decision in
a particular case.
The point of this example is this: I do not see any end or natural break
when we begin with the most abstract theory and continue down to the
most particular decision in a particular case. While one can of course
distinguish the most abstract part of the theory ("retributivism") from
much less general theories of particular doctrines or even particular
cases, there is some degree of abstractness, some degree of
generalization, all the way down the continuum described above. The
burden is on those who want to be theory-less to find some significant
break point in that continuum, a break point below which one is no
longer doing "theory." Yet, there is no such break point: it is theory all
the way down. So those aspiring to the theory-less position must reject
it all; there can be a theory of liability in a particular criminal law case
no more than there can be a theory of self-defense no more than there
can be a theory of the criminal law. About the only way one could be
led to this kind of view is to say that all knowledge is inherently
particularistic. We never use anything general because knowing
anything is intuitive, particular, contextualized, and so on.
Fish said as much at a debate we had in 1987 at the University of
Michigan. 0 According to Fish, it is fine to do the practice of theory, but
it has nothing to do with the practice of practice. Theory is just a
different practice. I told Stanley at that debate that he was trying to
unemploy me in my teaching of theory seminars for judges. He
admitted that he certainly was. Yet, after the session he asked me if he
could join me in one of the seminars. I asked Stanley what he would tell
the judges about the practice of judging, inasmuch as he could not use
any theory, no matter how discrete. Fish said, "I'd tell them not to listen
to you." Needless to say, that cooperation never happened.
On the merits, none of us thinks in the particularistic way that would
decry all theory. If you did not, for example, have some general notions
of logic, you wouldn't understand the sentence I am presently uttering.
You have to get the "if... then," you have to supply the missing
premise ("I do understand that sentence"), you have to use modus tollens
to negate the consequent, and now you make the inference. Right? We
all use more general stuff to interpret anything that is particular. So Fish
cannot mean what he literally says about knowledge. He must be
30. Fish's side of the debate became Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory,
supra note 16. My side became part of Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory:
A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871 (1989).
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critiquing something else when he is critiquing "theory."
One possibility is that he is critiquing foundationalist views of
justification in epistemology." Maybe when Fish decries "theory," he is
decrying those who claim to find foundational starting points in the
justification of beliefs, starting points that are "self-evident" or in some
other way unquestionable. If this is the critique, it is not a critique of me
for I agree with it. It is not the case that more abstract statements
("theories") have any kind of justificatory priority. It is not the case that
you should always start with the theory and then justify everything else
by applying the theory to the particulars. A nonfoundational view of
knowledge about law, ethics, or anything else gives as much priority to
the particular intuitions in particular cases as to intuitions about the
correctness of general statements. There is no epistemic priority to
theory in terms of justification. If that were Fish's point, we could all
agree.
A second possibility is that Fish is attacking a certain kind of
discovery procedure when he attacks "theory." His target here seems to
be a kind of deductive decision procedure whereby one decides a
particular case by deducing its result from more general standards. Yet
no believer in the power of theory need be stuck with some simple-
minded, deductive decision procedure whereby a judge simply finds the
theory and then deduces the result in a case from some abstract theory.
As a matter of discovery, judges often do better taking a cold shower or
doing any of the kind of "hunching" procedures of which the legal
realists in the 1920s were so fond.32 Yet what the "betterness" consists
in when the judge does better is to arrive at a deductively justified
decision, that is, a decision that does follow logically from a good
theory. In other words, where the judge ought to get to is determined by
theory, even if how he gets there may be without conscious application
of theory.
A third target for Fish lies in his construal of theories as kinds of texts.
A theory, in this view, has a canonical formulation like a statute. Worse,
such a canonically formulated set of standards can be sensibly applied
knowing no more than ordinary English semantics. Needless to say,
31. On foundationalist versus nonfoundationalist views in epistemology, see, for
example, ROBERT AUDI, THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION (1993).
32. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Initiative: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORN. L.Q. 274 (1929), reprinted in 39 S. TEx. L.
REv. 889 (1998).
Fish has little difficulty in shooting down this plain-meaning approach to
theories. His only real problem is finding anyone who views theories in
this way.
With those clarifications, we should see descriptive theory-building to
be a useful enterprise for the reasons described above. Theorizing an
area of law allows us to grasp quickly what such doctrines are about,
allows us to extend those doctrines in a principled way, and allows us to
render such doctrines consistent in the sense that they collectively
promote equality. Theories of tort, property, and so on, do all of these
things without for a moment succumbing to simple-mindedness in
decision procedures or naivetd about foundational status.
The fourth and last criticism I want to talk about has more to do with
Ron Allen's concerns than with Stanley Fish's. Allen's concerns are
causal criticisms, not logical ones, in the following sense: Allen's
question is not whether theories have logical implications for particular
cases; rather, his is a question of whether we theorists actually ever
make a difference in the world with our theories. Do those with power
over our law, such as judges or legislators, actually follow our theories
in their law-making, or do our theories have a causal impact on doctrine
in some less direct way? The case I mentioned a while ago, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California," the case about the man with the
three billion dollar spleen, is a counterexample for me. A majority of
the justices who decided that case had attended the seminars for judges
that I put on in California for a decade and a half. Sad to say, the
majority never learned one of the major lessons in those seminars, which
was that theory about an area of law gives judges more law with which
to decide seemingly novel cases. As Justice Mosk (who never took my
seminar) put it in his dissent, there was California property law bearing
on Moore's ownership of his spleen even though there was no obvious
law of statute or precedent' So sometimes, certainly, we theorists do
not have as much causal impact as we would hope.
On the other hand, there are examples the other way. Hart and
Honore's Causation in the Law" is one of the least cited books in legal
opinions on causation. Nonetheless, if you look at legal reforms by
interpreters of Hart and Honore, what you might conclude is that there
has been a trickle-down effect. By interpreters, I mean the likes of
Sandy Kadish, former Dean at Boalt, who has done much to influence
criminal law doctrine based on his understanding of Hart and Honore's
33. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
34. See id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
35. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
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theory.
3 6
Sometimes theory makes a difference; perhaps often it does not. I
guess, as a theoretical scholar, I would like theory to make a difference
in the real world, but I think the enterprise would be worthwhile even if
it does not. It would be nice if somebody understood what we are doing
in our various compartments of law, even if such understanding is
gained only by a theorist with no power to change our practices.
36. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985), reprinted in SANFORD H.
KADISH, BLAME AND PuNIsHMENT (1987).
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